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Abstract Funded social security programs are particularly vulnerable to economic
and financial market shocks. As a consequence of the recent crisis, a large fraction
of the Dutch pension funds had to submit restoration plans for the recovery of their
buffers. Such plans will have to rely primarily on a mix of reduced benefit indexation
and increased pension contributions. Hence, a discussion has emerged whether index-
ation should be differentiated across the various groups of participants in a pension
fund. We investigate this issue numerically, developing an applied many-generation
small open-economy OLG model with heterogeneous agents. The pension system
consists of a first-pillar PAYG component and a second pillar with a pension fund. In
our stochastic simulations, we hit the economy with a variety of unexpected demo-
graphic, economic and financial shocks. We compare uniform indexation of pension
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rights across all fund participants with alternatives such as status-contingent indexation
in which pensions are protected against price inflation. While the aggregate welfare
consequences are small, group-specific consequences are more substantial with the
workers and future born losing and retirees benefitting from a shift away from uniform
indexation. The exception is a scheme which links indexation directly to the fund’s
asset performance. Under this scheme the retired benefit without other groups losing.
The welfare effects are primarily the result of systematic welfare redistributions rather
than of shifts in the benefits of risk sharing. Contribution rates always have to rise sub-
stantially from their initial levels to maintain the system’s sustainability. An increase
in the retirement age that leaves existing pension rights untouched does little to avoid
this rise with its adverse labour market consequences.
Keywords Indexation · Funded pensions · Welfare effects · Pension buffers ·
Stochastic simulations
JEL Classification H55 · I38 · C61
1 Introduction
Funded social security systems are vulnerable to financial market shocks as the con-
sequences of the recent financial crisis have shown. These consequences have also
alerted both policymakers and academics to the question how risks should be shared
among the participants in funded pension systems. It is well known from the literature
that non-funded social security can raise welfare through the intergenerational shar-
ing of income risks (Enders and Lapan 1982; Merton 1983). However, there has been
less research on how pension funds can affect welfare through intergenerational risk
sharing. The literature suggests that income uncertainty is just weakly correlated with
the uncertainty on asset returns (Heaton and Lucas 2000). This makes pension funds
a priori suitable vehicles for risk sharing between workers and retirees. This is also
the case for the second pension pillar in the Netherlands, which to a certain extent can
be characterised as a defined-benefit (DB) system. In this paper we will explore how
the indexation of pension rights to price and wage inflation can be adjusted to improve
the operation of the system.
The overall Dutch pension system is largely based on an unfunded pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) first pillar and a funded second pillar.1 The system shares features with
systems like those in, for example, the U.S.,2 Germany and Switzerland. The second
pillar is unusually large, though, because it is roughly the size of the first pillar and it
is expected to grow further in relative terms. Through their contributions to sectoral
or company pension funds workers build up rights to a future nominal pension. Both
contribution and accumulation rates are identical across a fund’s participants. Hence,
1 The system also features a third pillar, which is based on voluntary (tax-facilitated) savings mostly
through insurance companies. This pillar is of relatively minor importance, though.
2 Nowadays, most pension funds in the U.S. are of a defined contribution (DC) type, but pension funds in
the public sector are generally of a DB type. Hence, the Dutch second pillar resembles more closely the
situation in the U.S. public sector.
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those on higher incomes contribute more and accumulate more rights. Second pillar
benefits are of a defined-benefit nature in the sense that accumulated rights guarantee
the holder a nominally-fixed benefit in euros as of retirement until death. Accumulated
rights are usually once a year heightened up to compensate for the past rate of price
inflation, with the aim of protecting the purchasing power of the pension, or wage
inflation, such that the pension benefit tracks the general increase in welfare. How-
ever, indexation is not required by law and the board of the pension fund may index
by less than full or not even at all if this is deemed necessary to maintain a healthy
funding ratio as measured by the ratio of pension assets over liabilities.
The pension fund is a vehicle for intergenerational risk sharing. For example, finan-
cial market developments affect the size of the pension buffers and may lead to a
change in the contribution rate and/or the indexation rate. This way, younger genera-
tions share in the financial market risks that tend to be mostly concentrated among the
older people. By linking indexation to wages, retirees share in the productivity risk
which is mostly born by the workers (Bohn 2006). Uncertainties in life expectancy
can be buffered by both changes in indexation and pension premia.
When the funding ratio falls below a given “long-term” threshold (roughly 125%
for a fund with average investment risk), the fund has to submit a “long-term” (15 year)
restoration plan to the supervisor, the Dutch central bank (DNB), to return to above
this threshold, while when the funding ratio falls below 105%, a situation called
“underfunding”, it has to submit a “short-term” (3 or 5 year) plan to eliminate the
underfunding. Funds have to rely on a mix of reduced indexation, higher contri-
butions and, in case these instruments provide insufficient restoration power, par-
tially writing off existing pension rights. The latter instrument is considered the
last resort and supervision is aimed at avoiding this in all but very exceptional
circumstances.
This paper focuses on changes in indexation as the main instrument for the stabili-
sation of pension buffers, because contribution rates in the Netherlands are generally
thought to have reached their “natural” maximum. There is a growing discussion
whether the policy parameters should be differentiated across the various groups of
participants in a pension fund. Specifically, Hurst and Willen (2007) find it typi-
cally welfare improving to have pension contributions increase with the worker’s age.
Indeed, in the Netherlands much of the discussion focuses on differentiating contribu-
tion or accumulation rates over cohorts in order to reduce the effective redistribution in
the system from younger to older cohorts. A related discussion concerns the differenti-
ation of indexation across the various groups of participants in a fund. By law (Article
58 of the Dutch Pension Law), indexation is uniform across the group of workers and it
is uniform across the group of all former workers and retirees together. The desirability
of uniform indexation is increasingly being called into question. However, there has
only been limited analysis of what would be the best way to differentiate indexation
across groups of fund participants. Exceptions are Ponds (2008) and Molenaar and
Ponds (2009), who explore a combination of indexation to the pension portfolio return
and to nominal wage growth, where the relative weight attached to the first component
is decreasing with age. In this paper we also analyse differentiated indexation across
participants. Differences with Ponds (2008) and Molenaar and Ponds (2009) con-
cern the types of differentiation we consider, the specification of the shock menu, the
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microfoundations underlying our model and our use of an explicit welfare comparison
among the alternative arrangements that we study.
Because accumulated pension rights are increasing over a person’s working life,
retirees and those close to retirement will be hurt most by a uniform reduction in
indexation. Moreover, these groups are left with little or no flexibility to make up for
any loss of indexation by working more, while, in addition, a given loss of purchasing
power has to be absorbed by a consumption reduction over a relatively short remain-
ing lifetime. Hence, these groups are at particular risk under policies that resort to
changing the indexation rate in order to keep pension buffers stable. Because financial
market risks are a major source of fluctuation in pension buffers, pension income of
the elderly is particularly sensitive to financial market shocks even though the younger
generations would be best placed to bear this source of risk, also given the imperfect
correlation between the return on human wealth and that on financial wealth. In fact,
the seminal analysis in Bodie et al. (1992) shows that the share of total (human plus
financial) wealth invested in equity should be constant over one’s lifetime, implying
that shocks in stock prices have identical proportional effects on consumption at all
ages. This would be an argument to shift a disproportionate part of the indexation
risk to younger workers, at least to the extent that this risk is primarily linked to the
financial market performance of the pension fund’s asset portfolio.
We explore a number of alternatives to uniform indexation across the participants.
One alternative is to have “status-contingent” indexation, in which the retired always
receive exactly enough indexation to compensate for price inflation, while the index-
ation rate of the entire group of workers moves uniformly in response to changes
in the pension buffer. This alternative is permitted under the Dutch pension law. We
also consider more complicated alternatives to uniform indexation that are currently
not allowed by Dutch pension law. One is to reduce changes in the indexation rate
with age, the idea being that older people hold more rights on average and, hence,
are hurt more severely by uncertainty in the indexation rate. A particularly interesting
alternative is that of what we refer to as “market-contingent” indexation, in which
indexation is a weighted average of the return on the pension fund’s asset portfolio
and the uniform indexation schedule, with the relative weight attached to the portfolio
return gradually declining with age to zero at retirement. This scheme comes close to
the schemes proposed in Ponds (2008) and Molenaar and Ponds (2009).
We develop an applied small-open economy overlapping generations model with
annual cohorts of heterogeneous agents and a pension system that incorporates the
main features of the Dutch system. In our stochastic simulations, calibrated to the
situation in the Netherlands, we hit the economy with a variety of unexpected shocks.
These may be broadly classified into three categories: demographic uncertainty (the
size of newborn generations and survival probabilities that determine life expectancy),
economic uncertainty (productivity growth and the inflation rate) and financial uncer-
tainty (bond and equity returns and yield curve).
At the aggregate level, as measured by the equivalent variation for all groups
together, the only schedule that outperforms uniform indexation is market-contingent
indexation. The average difference with uniform indexation in terms of compensating
initial resources tends to be relatively small, though, and is always less than 0.5%
of the initial resources of individuals. At the group level the effects are larger. Initial
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retirees benefit from a switch away from uniform indexation, while the workers and
future born are net payers for the switch. Only in the case of market-contingent index-
ation are those latter groups unaffected. Most of the benefit to the initially retired and
the payment by the others is purely redistributional. Only a relatively small part of
the welfare effects is the result of a difference in the effectiveness of risk sharing. We
also investigate the robustness of these results by varying within reasonable bounds
the initial pension buffer, the assumed equity premium and the volatility of the equity
returns. However, the results remain essentially unaltered in qualitative terms. Under
all indexation schemes, second-pillar contribution rates have to increase substantially
from initial levels to maintain the fund’s sustainability in the wake of increasing lon-
gevity. An increase in the retirement age that leaves existing pension rights untouched
does little to avoid this increase and leaves our basic results essentially unaltered.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the litera-
ture on risk sharing within social security systems. Section 3 lays out the main elements
of the model. Section 4 describes the policy rule and the various indexation schedules,
while Sect. 5 provides details about the calibration and simulation setup. Section 6
reports the results of the stochastic simulations for the various indexation schedules
under the benchmark calibration. This section also presents a robustness analysis of
our results. Section 7 concludes the main text. The “Appendix” gives details on the
estimation and the calibration of the shocks. Finally, the online appendix, available
at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/mint/beetsma.shtm, provides further details on the model,
the policy rule followed by the pension funds and the outcomes of some variations on
our benchmark.
2 Literature Review
Bodie et al. (1992) use a life-cycle model with the possibility to invest in two assets
(risk-free and equity). They start assuming a non-stochastic wage and consider the
case of a constant level of labour supply optimally chosen at the start of one’s life
and the case of a flexible labour supply that can respond to the performance of their
investment portfolio. In particular, a bad stock market performance induces individu-
als to increase their labour supply. More importantly, the opportunity to ex post vary
the labour supply leads individuals to invest with more risk. The main results are the
following. The optimal amount invested in equity is proportional to total wealth, i.e.
the sum of human and financial wealth. The initial amount of investment in equity is
likely to substantially exceed financial wealth at the beginning of one’s life. More-
over, it is higher under flexible labour supply. Further, the share of financial wealth
invested in equity is decreasing over one’s working life as human capital gets depleted
and becomes constant upon retirement. Bodie et al. (1992) also consider stochastic
wages. The processes for the wage rate and the stock price are assumed to be per-
fectly correlated. The consequence is that human capital can be seen as equivalent
to the combination of an investment in equity and an investment in a risk-free asset.
Hence, through their human capital individuals already possess an implicit investment
in equity and, hence, the explicit equity investment is the difference between the total
desired exposure to equity risk and the implicit exposure already present.
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In the view of Teulings and De Vries (2006) the role of pension funds is to take
intertemporal consumption decisions on behalf of participants who find it difficult
to take such decisions for themselves and to allow for intra-temporal sharing of lon-
gevity risks. They build a model in which individuals supply until their exogenous
retirement age a given amount of labour against a deterministic wage. Further, they
die at a given, known age and they can invest in risk-free bonds and risky equity. The
results on the optimal investment allocation are essentially identical to those in Bodie
et al. (1992). Gains from intergenerational risk-sharing can be obtained when new
pension fund participants absorb upon entry part of the fund’s gains or losses made
in recent years before the entry. This way new entrants invest over a longer period of
their life in equity, thereby further diversifying their risk exposure. This type of risk
sharing is effectively applied in the Dutch pension system, as new entrants share in
the under- or overfunding of their fund at the moment of entry, thereby sharing in the
past investment performance of the fund.
Cui et al. (2011) compare intergenerational risk sharing in funded pension schemes
with individually-optimal investment schemes. The funded pensions feature DB ele-
ments. If assets minus liabilities are positive (negative) then contributions may be
reduced (raised) and pension benefits may be raised (reduced). Three types of risk-
sharing rules are considered in the case of a mismatch. Under the first rule only contri-
butions are changed and only workers share in the risks. Under the second rule, only
benefits are changed and only the retired share in the risk, while under the final rule both
contributions and benefits are adjusted. This is the preferred regime, because under
this regime the largest number of generations share in the risks. Under this scheme
investment in risky assets is largest, while the adjustment parameters in contributions
and benefits are small implying that mismatch vanishes only gradually.
Bohn (2001) compares the welfare effects of population ageing and demographic
shocks between defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension schemes in a two-
period overlapping generations model meant to represent the U.S. economy. He argues
that neither of these schemes is efficient, because it is optimal that all risks are shared
by all generations, including the retired.
Our framework differs in a number of ways from that in the other contributions
discussed here. Different from Bohn (2001), our framework is a many-generations
small-open economy. He incorporates only demographic shocks, while in Teulings
and De Vries (2006) there is only uncertainty about the return on the investment port-
folio. Also in Bodie et al. (1992) there is only one source of uncertainty. Even when
wages are stochastic, they are perfectly correlated with equity returns. We allow for
more sources of risk than these other contributions. Specifically, in contrast to Bodie
et al. (1992), in our setup productivity risks and stock market returns are imperfect
correlated. This is important, because under this assumption a pension fund acquires
a useful role in reallocating productivity risk from workers to retirees and reallocating
stock market risk from retirees to workers. Apart from Bohn (2001), we deviate from
the other contributions by incorporating a rising life expectancy. Also in contrast to the
other contributions we allow for intragenerational inequality and we explicitly address
indexation policy, which plays a crucial role in DB funded pension systems. The
additional complications that we introduce in this paper also force us to make some
simplications in other directions. In particular, we will assume that the labour supply
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and the composition of individual investment portfolios are exogenous.3 This latter
assumption has the advantage that we simulate a model with realistic portfolio allo-
cations.4
3 The Model
We present an overlapping generations model in which individuals may not only differ
by birth year, but also by skill level. Given an individual’s age, the skill level deter-
mines his income. Our framework also incorporates a description of a two-pillar social
security system intended to model the main features of the Dutch pension system.
The first pillar is a PAYG arrangement organised by the government. It sets an
identical contribution rate for all workers such that this pillar is balanced on a period-
by-period basis. To every retiree it pays out a flat benefit, which is a given fraction of
average income, implying that the contribution rate is adjusted in response to shocks
to average income. Hence, the first pillar is a highly redistributive part of the Dutch
social security system. The second pillar consists of private pension funds that pro-
vide defined-benefit nominal pensions. Individuals with income above the so-called
franchise contribute to their fund and build up rights to a second-pillar pension benefit.
Both the intragenerational (skill) heterogeneity and the first pillar are essential ele-
ments of our model. The latter element is important despite the fact that the focus of
our analysis is on the second pillar. In our analysis, we not only want to explore the
qualitative effects of alternative indexation schedules, but we also want to assess the
quantitative consequences of alternative schedules. A realistic effort in this direction is
most safely achieved by incorporating the most relevant elements into the model. More
importantly, while we will be interested in the aggregate welfare effects of switching
away from uniform indexation, we will be far more concerned with the group-specific
consequences. Due to the way the first pillar has been set up in the Netherlands, for
an individual of given age, the magnitude of the welfare consequences differs sub-
stantially by skill level. Hence, it is precisely the combination of intragenerational
heterogeneity and the presence of our first pillar that is key to some of the main results
of the paper. In particular, given the franchise for the second pillar, for low-skilled
individuals the first pillar is the only or main source of income in retirement. As a
result, changes in the way second pillar pensions are indexed can only have limited
welfare consequences for these individuals.
3.1 Cohorts and Demography
A period in the model corresponds to one year. We assume that individuals enter the
labour force on their 25th birthday and we denote by the age of a cohort the amount
of time since entry into the labour force. An individual’s age is indicated by the index
3 Related works that allow for endogenous labour supply in funded pension systems are Bucciol and
Beetsma (2010) and Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010).
4 Investment allocations determined through optimisation lead to portfolios with unrealistically high shares
of equity. This is problematic for simulations aimed at realistically quantifying the consequences of alter-
native policy scenarios.
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j = 0, 1, . . . , D, where D is the maximum number of years a person can live after
entry into the labour force. Hence, there are D overlapping cohorts each period. Each
period there is an exogenous age-dependent probability that an individual will die. An
individual who has entered the labour force at the start of period t −( j − 1) = t − j +1
has an exogenous marginal probability ψ j,t− j+1 ∈ [0, 1] of reaching age j at the end
of period t conditional on having reached age j − 1 at the end of period t − 1. This
probability is stochastic and exhibits an upward trend, thereby also causing an upward
trend in the average age of the population. Further, the cohort of newborns (i.e. new
entrants into the labour force) in period t is 1 + nt times larger than the cohort of
newborns one period earlier, where nt is also stochastic.
3.2 Skill Groups and the Income Process
Each individual belongs to some skill group i , with i = 1, . . . , I , and remains in this
skill group during its entire working life. A higher value of i corresponds to a higher
skill level. The division into skill groups is such that all groups contain an equal num-
ber of individuals. Given the macroeconomic circumstances, an individual’s income
is uniquely determined by the combination of its age and skill level. In other words,
all the individuals of a given age in the same skill-group earn the same hourly wage.
Individuals work for R years after which they retire until their death. During their
working life, they receive a labour income yi, j,t given by:
yi, j,t = ei s j zt , (1)
where ei , i = 1, . . . , I is the efficiency index for skill group i, s j , j = 1, . . . , R is
a seniority index to allow income for a given skill level to vary with age, and zt is the
exogenous process
zt = (1 + gt ) zt−1, (2)
where gt is its exogenous, stochastic nominal growth rate and z1 = 1.
3.3 Social Security and Accidental Bequests
3.3.1 The First Pillar of the Social Security System
Each period, an individual of working age pays a mandatory contribution pFi, j,t to the
first pillar of the social security system. This contribution depends on its income yi, j,t





0 if yi, j,t < δl yt
θ Ft
(
yi, j,t − δl yt
)
if yi, j,t ∈
[




δu yt − δl yt
)




, j ≤ R, (3)
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is average income. In period t the benefit received by an individual retiree is a fraction
ρF of average income:
bFt = ρF yt . (4)
Each period the contribution rate θ Ft is adjusted such that aggregate contributions into
the first pillar equal aggregate first-pillar benefits. Notice that someone on an income
lower than δl yt pays no contribution, but still receives the same benefit as someone
with a high income.
3.3.2 The Second Pillar of the Social Security System
Each period, a worker pays a mandatory contribution pSi, j,t to the second pillar if
its income exceeds the franchise income level λyt , where parameter λ denotes the
franchise as a share of average income. Specifically,
pSi, j,t = θ St max
{
0, yi, j,t − λyt
}
, j ≤ R, (5)
where θ St is a policy parameter, which we assume to be capped at a maximum value
of θ S,max > 0. The contract underlying a second-pillar pension arrangement in the
Netherlands generally imposes a cap on the contribution rate and we include this
feature into the model. As we shall describe below, the contribution rate will depend
on the financial situation of the pension fund, as described by its funding ratio.
An individual from skill group i of cohort j receives a second-pillar pension benefit
linked to his entire wage history given by:
bSi, j,t = Mi, j,t , j > R, (6)
where Mi, j,t is the “stock of nominal pension rights” accumulated by the end of
period t . It is the annual benefit in euros that the retiree receives each year during
retirement, as long as this number is not revised through indexation or a reduction by
writing off existing rights.5 Variable Mi, j,t is a stock variable that increases with each






(1 − mt )
{ (
1 + ωi, j,t
)
Mi, j−1,t−1
+μ max {0, yi, j,t − λyt
}
}
, j ≤ R
(1 − mt )
(
1 + ωi, j,t
)





where parameter μ is the annual accrual rate and parameter ωi, j,t is the rate of index-
ation of nominal rights. It will depend on the financial position of the pension fund,
5 For example, someone of age 35 who has accumulated 2,000 euros of nominal rights, would, if he were
to stop working now and in the absence of indexation or a reduction, receive 2,000 euros each year as of
his 65th birthday.
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as we will detail below, and it is also allowed to be potentially cohort- and skill-group
specific. Further, mt > 0 is a proportional reduction in nominal rights that may be
applied when the funding ratio is so low that restoration is no longer possible using
other instruments, while mt < 0 when earlier reductions are undone. We assume that
mt > 0 only when ωi, j,t = 0. Each individual enters the labour market with zero
nominal claims (Mi,0,t− j = 0 for any i and t). In contrast to the first-pillar pension
benefit, the second-pillar benefit depends on both the cohort and skill level of the
individual.
Given the accrual rate μ and franchise share λ, the choice of the fund’s policy
parameters θ St , ωi, j,t and mt depends on the level of the nominal funding ratio
Ft = AtLt , (8)
where At and Lt are the values of the fund’s assets, respectively liabilities. At the end
of period t the fund’s assets are aggregate contributions in period t minus total benefits
paid out in period t plus the assets at the end of period t − 1 grossed up by their return































+ ze (1 + ret
)
, (10)
where r ft is the average nominal return on the fund’s assets in period t − 1, rlbt is the
return on long-term bonds and ret the return on equities. All asset returns are exoge-
nously determined on the international financial markets, in line with the situation of
the Netherlands being a small open economy operating under perfect capital mobil-
ity.6 Further, an exogenous share ze of the fund’s value is invested in equities and the
remainder in long-term nominal bonds. Actual data for Dutch pension funds show a
rather stable composition over the years, which may point to pension funds aiming at
stable targets for the various asset categories. For this reason we can assume that ze is
constant.
The long-term bonds held by the pension fund always have a 10-year maturity.
Therefore, at the end of each year bonds of 9-year maturity are sold for new 10-year
bonds. The online appendix shows that
6 Determining those returns endogenously would require us to turn our model into a general equilibrium
setup and explicitly model the supply of the assets by the government and firms. This would be beyond the
scope of our paper and would distract the attention from our main results.
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where rb10,t−1 (rb9,t ) is the yield on a 10-year (9-year) zero coupon bond in year t − 1
(year t).
The fund’s liabilities are the sum of the present values of current and future rights








Li, j,t , (11)
where Li, j,t is the liability to the cohort of age j and skill level i , which is computed
as the discounted sum of the projected future nominal benefits based on the current








































When j ≤ R, we discount all future benefits to the current year t , but of course they
will only be paid out once individuals have retired. Crucially, in the Netherlands the
computation of the liabilities excludes any future indexation. Hence, pension funds that
aim at maintaining the purchasing power of the accumulated rights need to maintain
a funding ratio that is substantially above 100%.
3.3.3 Accidental Bequests
The only role of accidental bequests in the model is to ensure that resources do not
“disappear” because people die. The government collects all the financial assets from
those who die and redistributes them through equal transfers to all those still alive.
3.4 The Individual Decision Problem
Each period individuals choose nominal consumption ci, j,t . The state variables are
assets ai, j,t and the income process zt . The individual’s value function is:
Vi, j,t
(



















1 + r j,t+1
) (
ai, j,t − ci, j,t + y˜i, j,t
)
,









1 − γ c˜
1−γ
i, j,t ,
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c˜i, j,t is real consumption,








yi, j,t + ht − pFi, j,t − pSi, j,t , if j ≤ R
bFt + bSi, j,t + ht , if j > R
}
,
where ht is the accidental bequest, while the portfolio rate of return depends on the
age-specific share invested in equities, x j :
1 + r j,t+1 =
(











1 − x j
)
is invested in one-year bonds against a return rsbt+1.
3.5 The Shocks
The estimation of the shock processes is described in detail in the “Appendix”.
Here, we provide a brief description. There are only aggregate shocks in the
model. The menu of shocks consists of demographic shocks, shocks to the income
growth rate and the inflation rate, which together determine productivity shocks,


















• nt : shock to the newborn cohort growth rate, nt .





• gt : shock to the nominal income growth rate, gt .
• πt : shock to the inflation rate, πt .
• et : shock to the nominal equity return, ret .
• sbt : shock to the 1-year “short-term” bond return, rsbt .
• bk,t , k = 2, . . . , D: shock to the nominal bond return at maturity k, rbk,t .
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All these shocks affect the funding ratio, while only demographic shocks affect
the first-pillar of the pension system. In response to the shocks the parameters of the
pension system may need to be adjusted to restore the balance in the first pillar and to
maintain the sustainability of the second pillar.
Each demographic shock is distributed independently of all the other shocks.
The growth rate nt of the newborn cohort depends on deterministic and random
components:
nt = n + nt ,
where n is the mean and nt the innovation at time t , which follows an AR(1) process.
The survival probabilities evolve according to a Lee and Carter (1992) model. Further,
we allow the shocks to the inflation rate, nominal income growth, the one-year bond
return and the equity return to be correlated with each other and over time. These


















































































































Hence, our shocks consist of a deterministic component, which is a linear combination
of previous-year shocks, and a purely random component, given by realizations from
i.i.d. innovations.
The yield curve is constructed by setting the return rb1,t at the one-year maturity
at rsbt and the returns at higher maturities k ≥ 2 equal to the sum of the one-year
return rsbt plus the excess of the return at maturity k relative to the one-year return,
r˜ bk,t , which is simulated on the basis of an estimated vector autoregressive distributed
lag (VADL) process with lag 1 for r˜ bk,t , k = 2, . . . , D.
3.6 Welfare Comparisons Between Policy Scenarios
We compare welfare between the two scenarios A (our benchmark scenario) and B
(the alternative) at the start of period t = 1 for individuals alive at that moment and
at the start of their first year of life for individuals that are born later. The individual
welfare comparison is based on the equivalent variation EVi, j,t , which for skill group
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i of cohort j we define as the amount of wealth that should be added in scenario A to
obtain the same utility as in scenario B. That is, for those alive at the start of t = 1,
we define EVi, j,1 by the equation
V Ai, j,1
(
ai, j,1 + EVi, j,1, z1
) = V Bi, j,1,
where
(
ai, j,1 + EVi, j,1, z1
)
are the arguments of the value function, that is the level
of assets plus the equivalent variation and the level of the income process at the start
of t = 1, while for those born at the start of t ≥ 2, we define EVi,1,t by the equation
V Ai,1,t
(
ai,1,t + EVi,1,t , zt
) = V Bi,1,t ,
where ai,1,t + EVi,1,t is the initial level of assets at birth plus the equivalent variation
and zt is the level of the income process at the start of t . The equivalent variations for


























This expression sums the equivalent variations of all individuals alive at time t = 1 and
the equivalent variations at birth ( j = 1)of all future-born individuals discounted at the




grows on average at the same rate g as nominal income and each new generation N1,k in
period k is on average (1 + n) times the size of the previous young generation. Hence,
the weight of future-born generations in the overall measure EV is made comparable
to the weight of the currently-alive generations.
As an alternative aggregate measure we take the percentage of those alive at t = 1









1{V Bi, j,1>V Ai, j,1
}.
where 1{.} is an indicator function that equals unity if the condition within the curly
parentheses holds, and 0 otherwise.
4 The Policy Rule
The government automatically adjusts the contribution rate θ Ft ∈ (0, 1) to maintain a
balanced first pillar of the pension system. On average, this contribution rate increases
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over the years along with the ageing of the population. More policy instruments are
available to affect the funding ratio of the second pillar. There are three key param-
eters, of which the period t + 1 values are determined on the basis of the funding




, an indexation parameter
κt+1 ≥ 0 and, as a last resort, a reduction (mt+1 > 0) or restoration (mt+1 < 0) of
the nominal pension rights. The board of the pension fund selects the contribution
rate and the indexation parameter, but can only reduce nominal rights under special
circumstances, as described below.
Policymakers aim at achieving a target indexation rate κ to average nominal wage
growth g, which in the sequel we set at the sum of π = 2% average annual price infla-
tion and 1% average annual productivity growth. Hence, g = 3%. Because average
price inflation is 2/3 of average nominal wage growth, long-run protection of pension
rights against price inflation would require setting κ = 2/3, which we shall do from
now on. Depending on the current financial situation of the pension fund, as measured
by the funding ratio, the actual average (across the population) indexation rate κt to
actual nominal wage growth gt may differ from the target indexation rate. The actual
individual indexation rate ωi, j,t of pension rights of an individual with skill level i
and age j in period t is given by:
ωi, j,t = gκ + [max {0, gtκt } − gκ] f (i, j) , (16)
where gtκt − gκ measures the deviation of actual average indexation gtκt from target
indexation gκ . If actual average indexation is relatively high, such that gtκt > gκ , and
f (i, j) > 0, then actual individual indexation exceeds target indexation. The func-
tion f (i, j) allows the pension fund to allocate more of less of the deviation of actual
average indexation gtκt from target indexation gκ to specific skill and age groups.
The idea is that some groups may have less capacity to bear the risk associated with
indexation, while other groups could have more capacity in this regard. Obviously, if
the fund in this way reduces indexation uncertainty for some groups, then for other
groups uncertainty is raised. Hence, we may have f (i, j) < 1 for some groups and
f (i, j) > 1 for other groups.
We describe now the link between the funding ratio and the actual average index-
ation rate. We define three threshold values for the funding ratio, ξ l = 1.05 < ξm <
ξu = 1.50, where ξm = 1.25.7 When the funding ratio Ft exceeds ξm , then, after
restoring possible earlier cuts in nominal rights, the fund sets the contribution rate
θ St+1 at its initial level θ S1 and the actual average indexation rate for the next period to
κt+1 = 23 + 13 Ft −ξ
m
ξu−ξm . Hence, indexation in t + 1 increases linearly in Ft and is com-
plete (equal to 1) at ξu . Notice that for Ft approaching ξm from above, κt+1 reaches
its long-run target level 23 . Notice also that the indexation rate exceeds unity when the
funding ratio exceeds ξu . This way the funding ratio is stabilised from above.
7 The lower threshold is the official one imposed by the supervisors in the Netherlands in order to protect
the nominal pension rights. The upper threshold corresponds to the one at which many funds start providing
full indexation to nominal wages, hence the one at which the value of the pension rights grows in line with
the overall welfare level.
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As mandated by the Dutch Pension Law, when the funding ratio falls below ξm , but
remains above ξ l , a long-term restoration plan is started, while when it falls below ξ l ,
a short-term restoration plan is started. The latter situation is termed “underfunding”.
The long-term restoration plan requires a restoration of the funding ratio to at least
ξm in at most K l = 15 years (ignoring possible future shocks), while the short-term
restoration plan requires restoration to at least ξ l in at most K s = 5 years (ignoring
possible future shocks). Hence, policy is aimed at keeping the funding ratio above ξm .
Specifically, within each year of the restoration plan indexation is set as follows:
κt+1 =
{




ξm−ξ l , if Ft ∈
(
ξ l , ξm
] . (17)
Notice that, if Ft approaches ξm from below, κt+1 also reaches its long-run target level
2
3 and, hence, there is no discontinuity in the scheme for κt+1 at Ft = ξm . Based on
the scheme (17), the projected funding ratio is computed (assuming further shocks
are absent) and compared with its target (ξ l or ξm) prescribed by the restoration plan.
If necessary, the contribution rate θ St is raised up to at most its maximum θ S,max.
Hence, there is a direct link between the contribution rate and the performance of the
pension fund’s asset portfolio as well as the indexation ambition gκ of the fund. A bad
performance of the fund’s assets or a higher indexation ambition make it more likely
for the funding ratio to fall below the thresholds at which restoration plans need to be
started. Conform Dutch Pension Law, when there is underfunding (Ft < ξ l ) and the
adjustments in the indexation parameter and the contribution rate are jointly insuffi-
cient, nominal rights are scaled back by whatever amount is necessary to eliminate the
underfunding within the allowed restoration period. In the case of a long-term resto-
ration plan, nominal rights remain untouched. A detailed description of the operation
of the restoration plans is found in the online appendix.
We consider a baseline of “uniform” indexation, in which actual indexation is the
same for all the fund participants, and four different schemes in which actual indexation
is made contingent. Under “status-contingent” indexation, retirees always receive a
certain indexation rate (corresponding to full price indexation on average), while all
the workers receive an identical, but uncertain indexation rate. Under “age-contin-
gent” indexation, the uncertainty about indexation falls with age. Under “income-
contingent” indexation, the uncertainty about indexation is smaller when the present
value of second-pillar pension income is larger relative to the present value of income
from all sources. Finally, under “market-contingent” indexation, indexation is partially
linked to the market performance of the fund’s asset portfolio, with the link becoming
smaller as one gets closer to retirement.
(1) Baseline: uniform indexation
In any given year, indexation is identical for all the individuals. That is,
f (i, j) = 1.
We take this as the benchmark case. It is also the most common situation in the
Netherlands.
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(2) Status-contingent indexation
For retirees the indexation rate is constant over time, whatever is the size of the
funding ratio. By contrast, all the workers are subject to identical uncertainty about
the indexation rate. Specially,
f (i, j) =
{
αs j ≤ R
0 j > R ,
where αs > 0. This is the simplest possible variation on the benchmark of uniform
indexation. The rationale for this scheme is that retirees have relatively little room for
responding to shocks, because their expected remaining life expectancy is relatively
low. Fixing the indexation rate may reduce their consumption uncertainty.
(3) Age-contingent indexation
All individuals are subject to uncertainty about actual indexation relative to target
indexation. However, the uncertainty shrinks with age. The rationale for this scheme
is analogous to that for the previous scheme: the older a person gets, the shorter its
expected time to death and the larger will be the effect of a given shock on its yearly
consumption flow. Specifically, we impose that
f (i, j) = αa (D − j) ,
where αa > 0.
(4) Income-contingent indexation
Indexation is subject to uncertainty for all individuals, but uncertainty is negatively
related to the present value of second-pillar pension income relative to the present
value of income from all sources (labour, accidental bequests and first- and second-
pillar pension benefits) at time t = 1.8 The idea is that for individuals, for whom
income from the second pillar of the pension system is relatively important, should
face less uncertainty about the indexation of this source of income than individuals
for whom the second pillar is a relatively minor income source. In particular, for an
age j and skill group i individual, the present value of second-pillar pension income
(henceforth termed “second-pillar pension wealth”) W Si, j,1 is given by:



















Notice that this present value takes into account the uncertainty around death age
(through the survival probabilities), and discounts future benefits using bond yield
returns, as is common practice in this literature (see, e.g., Bodie et al. 1992; Pelizzon
8 We take the values at the beginning of the simulation to avoid the circularity problem of having indexation
rates that depend on the rescaling function f (i, j), which in turn depends on indexation rates. The initial
indexation rate is known and is based on the initial funding ratio according to (17).
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and Weber 2009). To avoid complicating matters too much we discount expected future
benefits against the average yield curve rbl , l = 1, . . . , D (see the online appendix).
We define “first-pillar pension wealth” W Fi, j,1analogously as:



















and “labour income wealth” W Yi, j,1 as the present value of future labour income reali-
sations (plus accidental bequests and minus pension contributions):



















, j ≤ R
0, j > R
.
We may define “human wealth” as the sum of labour income wealth, first-pillar pension
wealth and second-pillar pension wealth. Finally, we define RSi, j,1 as the ratio between
second-pillar wealth and human wealth:
RSi, j,1 =
W Si, j,1
W Yi, j,1 + W Fi, j,1 + W Si, j,1
.
The rescaling function under income-contingent indexation is:










where αi > 0. The idea is that those with a relatively larger share of their human
wealth in the second pension pillar face less uncertainty about the deviation of actual
indexation of their second-pillar benefits from its target level.
In the above schedules, the rescaling function f (i, j) depends only on one param-
eter that we calibrate so as to produce a funding ratio similar to that under uniform
indexation. In particular, the parameter is always calibrated in such a way that applying















Figure 1 shows the profile of the indexation schedules. In general, contingent-
indexation policies reduce the difference between actual and target indexation rates for
older households. For income-contingent indexation, the deviations are also smaller
for richer households.
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Fig. 1 Rescaling functions. Notes The figure depicts for the various indexation schemes the relationship
f (i, j) as a function of age j and skill-level i . The skill level is only relevant for income-contingent index-
ation. For this latter case, in panel a. we take the average scheme across the various skill levels. This scheme
is very close to that of skill group 5
(5) Market-contingent indexation
Our fifth, and final, indexation scheme, which we refer to as “market-contingent”
indexation, is rather different from the previous ones. Under this scheme, which is
inspired by Ponds (2008) and Molenaar and Ponds (2009), indexation is as follows













, if j ≤ R
gtκt , if j > R
}
,
where we set b = r f − gκ so as to make the average contribution of this component
of the schedule equal to gκ . As it turns out, the fund’s portfolio performance r ft will
be more uncertain than the nominal wage indexation component gtκt . Hence, also this
schedule features falling indexation uncertainty as working life progresses. As under
status-contingent indexation, there is zero indexation uncertainty during retirement.
A distinctive feature of this schedule is that it establishes a direct link between the
performance of the asset portfolio and the increase in liabilities through indexation.
Hence, compared with the other schedules, one may expect a reduction in the risk of
mismatch between assets and liabilities.
5 Calibration and Simulation Details
5.1 Benchmark Calibration
The economically active life of an individual starts at his 25th birthday. He then works
for R = 40 years. Individuals live for at most D = 75 years after entry into the labour
force. We set the discount factor at β = 0.96, a rather common number in the mac-
roeconomic literature (e.g., see Imrohoroglu 1989; Krebs 2007), and the coefficient
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of relative risk aversion at γ = 3, which accords quite well with the assumed risk
aversion in much of the macroeconomic literature (see, e.g., Imrohoroglu et al. 2003)
as well as estimates at the individual level (for example, Gertner 1993 and Beetsma
and Schotman 2001). The efficiency index {ei }Ii=1 is based on the income deciles for
the Netherlands for the year 2000 reported by the World Income Inequality Database
(WIID, version 2.0c, May 2008). We normalise the index such that it has an average




j=1 uses the average of Hansen (1993) esti-
mation of median wage rates by age group. We take the average between males and
females and interpolate the data using the spline method. The composition of indi-
vidual investment portfolios is exogenously given and the shares x j , j = 1, . . . , D
invested in equity are based on the figures reported by age in Table 9 of Alessie et al.
(2001).
The social security parameters are based on those for the Dutch pension system.
The maximum income assessable for contributions to the first pillar is 3, 850.40 euros
per month in 2008, as reported by the Dutch Tax Office (“Belastingdienst”). Therefore,
we set δu = 1.10, which is roughly equal to 3, 850.40 ∗ 12/42, 403, where 42, 403
euros is our imputation for the economy’s average income for 2008.9 Further, we set
δl = 0.4685, so as to generate an initial contribution rate of θ F1 = 12.77% that is
identical to the initial second-pillar contribution rate, θ F1 = θ S1 . The latter we calcu-
late on the assumption that aggregate contributions and benefits at time 1 are equal in
the absence of shocks. This value of θ S1 is close to the actual value in the Netherlands.
We cap θ St at θ S,max = 25%. Finally, we set the benefit scale factor at ρF = 0.2435.
We assume that the pension fund always invests half of its portfolio in equities,
hence we set ze = 0.50 for any level of the funding ratio Ft . This corresponds roughly
to the balance sheet average for Dutch pension funds over the past 10 years (DNB
2009). Because realised returns on bond and equity investments will generally differ,
at the end of each period the fund reshuffles its portfolio such that at the start of the
next period the equity share is again ze = 0.50. We set the pension accrual rate μ to
2% and the franchise parameter λ to 0.381.10
We calibrate ρF and λ so as to generate realistic replacement rates at retirement
date that are on average equal to 30.40% for the first pillar and 37.60% for the second
pillar. The first-pillar replacement rate is decreasing in the skill level and ranges from
an average of 12.06% for the highest skill group to 63.33% for the lowest skill group.
By contrast, the second-pillar replacement rate is higher for more skilled groups and
ranges from an average of 3.78% to an average of 56.64%. The overall replacement
rate of the two pillars together is higher for more skilled groups, but differences are
small and the average replacement rates range from 67.11 to 68.70%.
The deterministic component of the growth rate of the newborn cohort, n =
0.2063%, is the average annual growth rate based on the estimation of an order-
9 Eurostat’s most recent figure on average Dutch income refers to the year 2005. The same source also
provides minimum income until the year 2008. Exploiting the correlation between average and minimum
income, we run an OLS regression of average income on minimum income. As a result, we predict the
average income for year 2008 to be 42,403 euros.
10 The maximum accrual rate that is fiscally facilitated in the Netherlands is 2.25% for pension arrange-
ments based on the average wage over the working life and 2% for arrangements linked to the final wage.
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Table 1 Benchmark calibration of the exogenous parameters
Symbol Description Calibration
General setting
D Number of cohorts 75
R Number of working cohorts 40
β Discount factor 0.96
γ Relative risk aversion parameter 3




j=1 Seniority index Hansen (1993)




Income thresholds in the contribution formula {0.469, 1.10}
ρF Benefit scale factor 0.2435
Second pillar pension parameters
ze Equity share in fund portfolio 0.5
{
K S , K L
}
Restoration periods in years {5, 15}
μ Second-pillar pension accrual rate 0.02
λ Franchise share 0.381
F1 Initial funding ratio 1.15
θ S,max Upper bound on contribution rate 0.25
Annual averages of the random variables
π Inflation rate 2%
g Nominal income growth rate 3%
rsb One-year nominal bond return 3%
re Equity return 6%
one moving-average model of the annual number of births in the Netherlands over the
period 1906–2005 (source is the Human Mortality Database 2009). Our calibration of
the survival probabilities is based on the estimation of a Lee and Carter (1992) model
using Dutch period survival probabilities.11 The combination of survival probabilities
and birth rates determines the size of each cohort. The starting value of the old-age
dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of retirees over workers) is 20.99%, in line with the
OECD (2009) figure for the Netherlands in 2005.
The averages we calibrate for price inflation, nominal income growth and the bond
and equity returns are reported in the final four lines of Table 1. We loosely follow the
literature (see, e.g., Brennan and Xia 2002; Van Ewijk et al. 2006) and, as already men-
tioned, set average annual inflation at π = 2% and average annual nominal income
growth at g = 3%. This corresponds to average real productivity growth of 1% per
annum. We set the average 1-year bond yield at rsb = 3%. Finally, we set the average
11 With these probabilities, the average population age is initially set to 48.21 years and the remaining life
expectancy to 33.54 years, as opposed to 33.23 years for a 48-year old in 2005 according to the actual data
(see Human Mortality Database 2009).
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annual equity return at re = 6% in order to generate a funding ratio that is stable over
time in the absence of shocks and policy parameter changes.
5.2 Simulation Details
We draw Q = 1,000 sequences of vectors of unexpected shocks over 2D −1+250 =
399 years, simulated from the joint distribution of all the shocks. Our welfare calcu-
lation is based on the economy as of the Dth year in the simulation. Hence, we track
only the welfare of the cohorts that are alive in that year, implying that those that die
earlier are ignored, and we track the welfare of cohorts born later, the latest one dying
in the final period of the simulation. In other words, the total number of years of one
simulation run equals the time distance between the birth of the oldest cohort that we
track and the complete extinction of the last unborn cohort that we track. In each period
there are D overlapping generations. For convenience, in the simulation we relabel the
Dth year as t = 1. The first D − 1 years of our simulation, the “initialisation phase”,
are needed to generate a distribution of the assets across the various groups at the start
of t = 1.
In each simulation run, we set the trends in newborn growth rates and in survival
probabilities to zero after t = 40, thereby stopping the ageing process after t = 40,
although the shocks to both processes remain. Hence, also mortality rates at any given
age are no longer on a falling trend. We stop the ageing process, because we want to
avoid an ever-growing population as a result of the ageing process and the associated
complications with the simulations.12
To allow for a proper comparison of the various indexation schedules, we use the
same simulated shock series for each schedule both during the initialisation phase and
during the remainder of the simulation run. At the start of the initialisation phase the
pension rights of all the individuals are set to zero and during this phase they accumu-
late pension rights according to (7), while indexation is always uniform and applied
according to the schedule (16) and (17). Hence, the situation at the start of t = 1 is
identical for each run under the various indexation schedules. At the start of t = 1,
the process zt is rescaled to unity (z1 = 1) and both the nominal pension rights and
the assets accumulated through voluntary savings of all the individuals are rescaled by
the same factor. Using (11) and (12), we can then compute total pension liabilities at
the start of t = 1. Because welfare depends on the size of the buffer after the initiali-
sation period in the simulation run, we reset the stock of pension fund assets such that
the funding ratio at the start of t = 1 equals the desired initial funding ratio, which is
12 Meaningful simulations of the very long run with permanent ageing require that the retirement age
follows the increase in life expectancy and that accumulated pensions rights are properly adjusted (see
also below). Otherwise, pension funds will suffer from a permanent state of underfunding, workers will
face ever-rising contribution rates or retirees will suffer from continuing erosion of the purchasing power
of their pensions. Hence, the consequences of the ageing process may be even worse for pension funds
than simulated here if ageing is assumed to be permanent. There is no agreement on the question of this
permanency, although Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) demonstrate that the assumed limits to life expectancy
have so far always proven wrong.
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Fig. 2 Funding ratio. Notes: The figure depicts for each of the first 75 years into the simulation run (after
the initialisation phase) the median value and the median coefficient of variation across the simulation runs






Hence, the assets and liabilities of the pension fund at the start of t = 1 are identical
across the various indexation schedules. The starting assets of the newborns are zero
at the start of t = 1, ai,1,1 = 0.
6 Results
6.1 Benchmark Analysis
Panel a of Fig. 2 shows the median funding ratio for the various indexation schemes





interval and, after the initial couple of years, when the funding ratio
restores quickly from a situation of underfunding, there is no clear trend visible. The
dispersion in the median funding ratios across the various indexation schemes is rather
small. This is also the case for the coefficient of variation of the funding ratio, which
is defined as half the interquartile range over its median. It shows an upward trend.
The exception is the case of market-contingent indexation, where the volatility of the
funding ratio is clearly lower and the upward trend is much weaker (see panel b of
Fig. 2).
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the various indexation policies. The sta-
tistics associated with the funding ratio and the policy instruments are rather similar
across the various cases, except for the case of market-contingent indexation. While
the correlations between the values of the assets and the liabilities are between 65
and 70% for the other cases, under market-contingent indexation this correlation is
13 Initial assets A0 are 1.13 times aggregate income in the economy. This is quite comparable with
second-pillar pension assets in the Netherlands which are on the order of 120–130% of GDP.
14 We report the median rather than the average funding ratio, because the former is not affected by the
few extreme outcomes in our simulations.
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Table 2 Funding ratio properties, benchmark case
% Uniform Status Age Income Market
contingent contingent contingent contingent
Funding ratio volatility (CV=coefficient of variation)
Median CV 26.534 29.471 28.124 27.415 17.153
Median CV, assets 35.254 35.579 35.866 35.337 29.684
Median CV, liabilities 47.904 49.534 49.984 48.650 36.928
Assets-liabilities correlation 67.051 66.925 63.540 68.963 90.723
Probability of a funding ratio below a given threshold
Below ξ l 16.991 16.917 17.131 17.021 13.000
Below ξm 38.652 37.597 37.669 38.200 34.771
Below ξu 62.961 61.343 61.547 62.117 64.051
Probability of a change in the indexation and contribution rates (with a ratio below ξm )
Only indexation rate 3.839 4.263 4.371 4.192 5.456
Both rates is enough 34.176 32.723 32.683 33.365 28.183
Both rates is not enough 0.637 0.612 0.616 0.643 1.132
Average policy parameters (standard deviation in parentheses)
Contribution rate θ St 19.554 19.493 19.360 19.459 18.830
(5.917) (5.923) (5.940) (5.930) (5.959)
Indexation rate κt 62.722 64.425 66.035 64.457 64.410
(61.344) (61.400) (61.502) (61.424) (9.694)
% Welfare comparison relative to uniform indexation
PER – 22.014 25.353 14.491 99.970
EV – −0.471 −0.160 −0.489 0.394
Statistics are based on all simulation runs, excluding the initialisation phase. The columns report the cases
of uniform indexation and the alternative indexation arrangements. Further, CV = coefficient of variation,
P E R = percentage of those alive at t = 1 in favour of an alternative to uniform indexation, EV = equiv-
alent variation, measured as the percentage increase in initial income under uniform indexation of those
alive at t = 1 and the future born that makes aggregate welfare equal to that under the alternative. Hence,
a negative value indicates that aggregate welfare under the alternative is lower
over 90%, implying a substantially smaller mismatch between the values of the assets
and the liabilities, which explains the lower funding ratio volatility for this alternative
as well as the lower probability of a funding ratio below ξ l = 105% (13% versus
around 17% for the other alternatives). Nevertheless, this still is substantially more
frequent than the 2.5% of time that was foreseen by DNB, but it may quite well be in
line with the frequency of underfunding that we have observed over the past decade
in the Netherlands. The likelihood that the funding ratio is below ξm = 125% and a
long-term restoration plan is needed is always in the range 34–39%. This likelihood
equals the probability that one or more of the policy instruments needs to be altered.
The likelihood that the indexation rate needs to be adjusted is around the range of
3.5–6%. The likelihood that both the indexation rate and the contribution rate have to
be altered and that these adjustments are sufficient is in the range of 28–35%. Finally,
the likelihood that these adjustments are jointly insufficient and pension rights need
to be cut is in the range of 0.6–1.2%.
We observe that the average indexation rate is in the range of 62–65%, implying
an average indexation of 1.85–1.95% of the stock of nominal rights, which is only
slightly below what is sufficient to preserve the purchasing power of the pensions.
Figure 3 shows the average (remaining for those alive at t = 1) life-cycle indexation
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Fig. 3 Lifetime indexation (% accumulated rights). Notes The figure depicts for each cohort the average
indexation rate over the years of its life










































Fig. 4 Average policy parameters. Notes The figure depicts for each of the first 75 years into the simulation
run (after the initialisation phase) the average values of the policy parameters across the simulation runs
for each cohort in our simulations. Due to the starting position of the funding ratio
below ξm and, hence, the low initial indexation, except in the case of status-contin-
gent indexation, the older generations alive at t = 1 experience low average indexation
over their remaining lifetime. The younger generations, and those born after t = 1,
enjoy average lifetime indexation slightly below 2%. The average contribution rate is
in the range of 18–20% for the various cases under consideration (Fig. 4, panel b),
which is about fifty percent above the starting value of the second-pillar contribution
rate. Hence, the almost entire preservation of the purchasing power of the pensions
while the population is ageing results in a substantially higher average contribution
rate than at the start of the simulation run. This result confirms the message of the
Goudswaard-Report (Goudswaard et al. 2010) that in absence of additional measures
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to preserve the sustainability of the Dutch second pillar, contributions need to increase
to potentially unacceptable levels over the coming decades.15
Table 2 also reports a welfare comparison of alternative indexation schemes
with the benchmark of uniform indexation. For all alternatives, except for market-
contingent indexation, uniform indexation is preferred by a majority of those alive in
period 1 (as indicated by P E R < 50). Also, when measured by the aggregate equiv-
alent variation EV , uniform indexation outperforms all these alternatives, although
the outperformance is on average relatively small. The value of −0.471% for EV
under status-contingent indexation should be interpreted as follows. Status-contingent
indexation produces the same welfare as uniform indexation if under status-contin-
gent indexation each generation alive at t = 1 gets 0.00471 extra in resources (or
0.471% of their expected initial income), since the income process is normalised to
unity at t = 1, newborns at t = 2 get 0.00471 ∗ (1 + g2) extra, the newborns at
t = 3 get 0.00471 ∗ (1 + g2) (1 + g3) extra, etc. Market-contingent indexation is the
only alternative that performs better than uniform indexation. Of those alive at t = 1,
virtually everyone benefits from market-contingent indexation. The aggregate welfare
improvement as measured by an EV of 0.394% is rather limited.
Figure 5 reports the welfare consequences for different cohort-skill combinations
of replacing uniform indexation with one of its alternatives. Points above the hori-
zontal axis indicate a welfare gain compared with uniform indexation, and vice versa
for points below the horizontal axis. Considering the overall effect of a switch away
from uniform indexation, we see that those who are retired at t = 1 benefit on average
substantially (in the range of 1–3% of period t = 1 income) under any of the alter-
natives. Whenever the funding ratio is below ξm , average indexation falls short of its
target level. While under uniform indexation this shortfall is equal across generations,
under the alternatives the shortfall of the younger generations is larger than for the
retired. Given that the initial funding ratio is below ξm and that the ageing process
puts systematic downward pressure on the funding ratio, indexation of the younger
generations under the alternatives to uniform indexation is systematically lower than
indexation of the retirees. The exception is market-contingent indexation, which is
not subject to a rescaling function. Obviously the benefit is lower for retirees from
the lower skill classes because the second-pillar benefits are relatively less important
as a source of income. A benign feature of market-contingent indexation is that the
welfare gain of the initial retirees is not achieved at the cost of losses for the younger
generations at t = 1 and the future born. Under the other alternatives, these groups
lose out and pay for the benefit enjoyed by the retired.
By calculating EV no shocksi, j,1 and EV
no shocks
i,1,t when the shocks are absent and
subtracting those values from the “overall” effects EVi, j,1 and EVi,1,t , we obtain the
15 It is of interest to compare the projected increase in the contribution rate with that computed in the
“Appendix” to the Goudswaard-Report (Goudswaard et al. 2010). The Report takes 2009 as the initial year
of its simulation and assumes that the initial funding ratio is 105%. Based on an average nominal portfolio
return of 5%, the contribution rate as a share of total salary rises from 12.7% in 2009 to 17.2% in 2050
(with a peak of 19.4% in 2025). The increase in the contribution rate is proportionally somewhat less than
in our model, in which contribution rates are expressed in terms of income above franchise. The difference
is mostly explained by the fact that the return on the pension portfolio is slightly lower in our case (4.5%
instead of 5%), despite the lower initial funding ratio in the Goudswaard-Report.
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Fig. 5 Welfare comparison (EV). Notes Equivalent variation (EV ) for specific groups, as characterised
by birth year and skill level. We measure EV as the percentage increase in initial income under uniform
indexation that makes aggregate welfare equal to that under the alternative. Hence, a negative value indicates
that aggregate welfare under the alternative is lower. We depict the overall welfare effect and the component
that is due to risk sharing only
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equivalent variations that are purely attributable to the presence of the shocks. Hence,
these are the gains (or losses, if negative) from better (worse) risk sharing under the
alternative to uniform indexation. The risk-sharing effects are relatively small com-
pared to the overall effects, implying that, except under market-contingent indexation,
the overall effects are dominated by systematic redistributions from workers and future
borns towards those that are retired at t = 1.
6.2 Robustness Analysis: Varying the Institutional Features
This subsection varies some of the pension fund’s institutional features. To save space,
we report the tables and figures with the detailed results in the online appendix. Under
the first variant, the second-pillar contribution rate is always kept fixed at its initial
level, i.e. θ St = θ S1 for all t . Hence, all the action needed to stabilise the funding ratio
takes place via adjustment of the indexation rate or through a reduction in the nomi-
nal rights when necessary. The volatility in the indexation rate is higher than before,
although not much except in the case of market-contingent indexation. In addition,
the correlation between the assets and the liabilities becomes higher, thereby resulting
in a less volatile funding ratio. Interestingly, the probability of underfunding under
market-contingent indexation is now higher than under any alternative indexation
scheme, rather than lower as in the benchmark analysis. Importantly, and not surpris-
ing, with the contribution rate not being allowed to rise in response to the population
ageing, the average indexation rate is substantially lower than under the benchmark
case. Under market-contingent indexation, the average indexation rate is even less
than half its original value. Hence, retirees will be confronted with a gradual decline
in the purchasing power of their second-pillar benefits as they grow older.
Second, we consider a lower initial funding ratio of 105% and a higher initial
funding ratio of 125% instead of the benchmark value of 115%. This is a relevant
variation, because we have seen recently that, as a result of the turbulence in the
financial markets, funding ratios of Dutch pension funds can vary substantially over
relatively short periods of time. Hence, the starting conditions can change rather dra-
matically over a short time interval. Most of our earlier results are preserved when
we change the initial funding ratio. However, not surprisingly, with a lower initial
funding ratio of 105%, the likelihood of underfunding and the average contribution
rate become slightly higher, while the average indexation rate becomes slightly lower.
The opposite occurs when the initial funding ratio is set at 125%.
Finally, we vary the portfolio composition of the fund’s assets. Our benchmark
assumed equal portfolio shares of bonds and equities. We consider a low equities
share of 25% and a high equities share of 75%. On the one hand, the recent crisis
has increased public awareness of the risks associated with funded pensions, which
may force fund managers to scale back the riskiness of their portfolios. There has
been some movement into this direction by Dutch pension funds, although this may
also be the result of the need to reduce the risk of further decreases in the funding
ratio from levels that are already low. On the other hand, with rising life expectancy
and pension contributions reaching the limits of what is reasonably acceptable, the
affordability of a decent (expected) pension outcome requires pension funds to invest
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more heavily in equities. Not surprisingly, with a lower share of pension portfolios
invested in equities, the volatility of the funding ratio is lower. The opposite is the case
when the equity share is raised relative to the benchmark share. An increase in the
equities share has two opposite effects on the chances of underfunding (i.e., a funding
ratio below 105%) and a cut in nominal rights. On the one hand the higher volatility
of the funding ratio raises those chances, while on the other hand the higher average
portfolio return reduces those chances. We see that a change in the equities share gives
rise to non-monotonicities. Both the fall and the rise in the equities share relative to the
benchmark reduce the chances of underfunding, but raise the likelihoods of nominal
rights cuts (except for market-contingent indexation when the equities share is raised).
As far as the welfare consequences of our variations are concerned, in all instances
the aggregate welfare effects as measured by the equivalent variation are small, while
we consistently find support only for market-contingent indexation.
6.3 Robustness Analysis: Varying the Characteristics of Equity Shocks
Forecasts about future equity returns are particularly difficult to make, especially
under the current economic circumstances. Moreover, the Don et al. (2009) “Parame-
ters Commission” failed to agree on the expected equity return that the Dutch pension
funds should use when calculating the contribution rate. Hence, it is important to
investigate the sensitivity of our results for different assumptions about the equity
process. Again, we report the results in the online appendix. First, compared to the
benchmark, we consider both a lower average equity return of 4% and a higher one of
8%. We find that a lower average equity return produces a less volatile funding ratio
and, not surprisingly, a higher average contribution rate and a substantially (23–24%
percentage points) lower average indexation rate than under the benchmark calibra-
tion. The opposite occurs when the average equity return is raised. While qualitatively
the effects of a change in the average equity return go into the anticipated direction,
quantitatively they are rather limited. Because the policy parameter settings depend
(primarily) on the funding ratio and the policy rule is aimed at limiting the movements
in the funding ratio, this may explain the limited magnitude of the effects.
Second, we vary the volatility of the equity shock. The benchmark estimate of the
standard deviation is 0.143 (see Table 4(b) in the “Appendix”). Here, we consider
a 50% lower standard deviation of 0.0715 and a 50% higher one of 0.2145, while
keeping all the other VAR estimates fixed. A lower volatility of the equity shocks
produces a higher correlation of assets and liabilities and, hence, a lower volatility of
the funding ratio and a lower probability of underfunding. The opposite effects (except
for the assets-liabilities correlation under market-contingent indexation) result from
imposing a higher volatility of the equity shock.
As far as the welfare consequences of our variations are concerned, in all instances
the aggregate welfare effects of a switch away from uniform indexation as measured
by the equivalent variation EV are of the same sign and order of manitude as under
the benchmark and thus rather small. Again the younger workers and the future born
pay for the benefit that the elderly at t = 1 enjoy.
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6.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Raising the Retirement Age
An increase in the retirement age is usually put forward as one of the main options
to increase the financial sustainability of the Dutch second-pillar pension system. In
our model, life expectancy at birth rises from 78.7 years for those born at time t = 1
to 83.0 years for those born at time t = 41, after which it remains stable because
we assume no further growth in the survival probabilities. Our simulations up to now
have been done under the assumption that the retirement age remains constant. We
will now explore how our benchmark results are affected if we let the retirement age
gradually increase, such that the approximate 1:2 ratio of average retirement length
relative to average work life length is preserved. Concretely, this implies that we raise
the retirement age at three moments, namely from 65 to 66 years at t = 11, from 66
to 67 years at t = 26 and, finally, from 67 to 68 years at time t = 41. After t = 41,
the retirement age is kept fixed at 68 years. To aim at the same replacement rate after
a full working life under the new life expectancy, whenever we raise the retirement
age from Rold to Rnew = Rold + 1, we also reduce the accrual rate μ, from μold to
μnew = μold (Rold/Rnew). We assume that existing rights remain untouched. Hence,
older workers accumulate pension at a slower pace for only a relatively short period.
For example, someone who is 60 years at t = 11, will accumulate pension rights
for the next 6 years at a rate of μnew. Obviously, given that μnew = μold (40/41),
Table 3 Funding ratio properties, varying retirement age
% Uniform Status Age Income Market
contingent contingent contingent contingent
Funding ratio volatility (CV=coefficient of variation)
Median CV 24.942 27.201 27.715 27.596 17.042
Median CV, assets 35.220 35.431 35.652 35.794 29.614
Median CV, liabilities 47.221 48.631 49.420 48.278 36.823
Assets-liabilities correlation 65.676 67.307 65.056 68.558 90.947
Probability of a funding ratio below a given threshold
Below ξ l 16.839 16.736 16.892 16.685 12.941
Below ξm 38.721 38.023 37.468 37.860 32.271
Below ξu 63.596 62.251 61.571 61.872 61.943
Probability of a change in the indexation and contribution rates (with a ratio below ξm )
Only indexation rate 3.869 4.371 4.391 4.356 5.571
Both rates is enough 34.204 33.033 32.444 32.875 28.012
Both rates is not enough 0.648 0.619 0.633 0.629 1.045
Average policy parameters (standard deviation in parentheses)
Contribution rate θ St 19.626 19.570 19.339 19.457 18.820
(5.905) (5.910) (5.941) (5.931) (5.954)
Indexation rate κt 65.520 69.607 70.793 68.579 70.131
(70.918) (73.787) (73.283) (72.987) (15.796)
% Welfare comparison relative to uniform indexation
P E R – 20.410 20.410 20.410 99.957
EV – −0.338 −0.140 −0.325 0.562
The retirement age is gradually raised from 65 to 66 years at t = 11, to 67 at t = 26 and to 68 at t = 41.
Further, see notes to Table 2
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this person will retire with a higher replacement rate than under the old retirement
age. Not surprisingly, the numerical outcomes reported in Table 3 are rather similar
to those under the benchmark. This is the case for the behaviour of the pension buffer
and the frequency with which long-term and short-term restoration plans need to be
implemented. Also the average values of the policy parameters are similar to those
under the benchmark. The average contribution rates remain virtually the same, while
average indexation rates are only 3–6% points higher than under the benchmark. The
aggregate welfare effects of a switch away from uniform indexation remain rather
small, while retirees continue to benefit from such a switch at the cost of the workers.
The magnitudes of the intergenerational welfare shifts remain of the same orders of
magnitude as before. Overall, these results show that, in the face of an increase in the
retirement age in response to rising life expectancy, reducing the accumulation rate
of pension rights without touching existing rights will only have limited effect on the
sustainability of the second pillar.16
This finding sheds light on the current discussion about the adjustment of the second
pillar in the Netherlands. While there is general agreement that with its current gener-
osity and the unwillingness to substantially raise contribution rates the system becomes
unsustainable at current benefit levels, there is disagreement as to what extent existing
pension rights should be protected. Our finding that a mere slowdown in the accumu-
lation of new pension rights fails to improve the system’s sustainability in response to
ageing demonstrates that existing pension rights would need to be reduced to ensure
a decent pension for future retirees. This would imply a relatively substantial contri-
bution from older workers and current retirees to ensure the system’s sustainability.
7 Conclusions
We have analysed the consequences of differentiating the indexation of pension rights
to nominal price and wage inflation across groups of participants in a funded pension
system like that in the Netherlands. Our analysis was based on stochastic simulations
of a small-open economy overlapping-generations model subject to demographic, eco-
nomic and financial shocks. We have compared the usual Dutch practice of uniform
indexation across all participants, with status-contingent indexation, which protects
retirement benefits against price inflation, age-contingent, income-contingent and mar-
ket-contingent indexation. Pension buffers behave rather similarly under most alter-
natives, both in terms of their median and volatility. This may not be so surprising
given that the policies that regulate the value of the buffers are identical across the var-
ious scenarios. Only under market-contingent indexation, is buffer volatility markedly
lower than in the other cases. At the aggregate level, as measured by the equivalent
variation for all groups together, uniform indexation tends to perform better than most
of the alternatives. Again, market-contingent indexation is the exception. However,
the differences among the alternatives in terms of compensating initial resources are
relatively small, though. The initial retirees benefit from a shift away from uniform
16 Obviously, if the accrual rate of pension rights were to be kept unchanged, sustainability would be even
weaker.
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indexation. Except under market-contingent indexation, the workers and the future
born are net payers for such a shift. Moreover, the group-specific welfare effects tend
to be almost entirely redistributional. A shift to market-contingent indexation benefits
the initially retired without hurting other age groups. Hence, this alternative provides
a particularly interesting case for further study.
There is a growing discussion in the Netherlands about the benefits of differen-
tiating pension fund policies across groups of participants. Differentiation can take
place along a variety of dimensions, in particular, in terms in pension contributions,
the accrual rate of the pension rights, the asset portfolios held by fund participants
and indexation of pension rights. Our results suggest that for this latter form of dif-
ferentiation to produce aggregate benefits a careful design of the contingencies in the
indexation rule is necessary, otherwise the aggregate benefits will be negative. Never-
theless, one should be careful not to draw premature conclusions. The reason is that we
have essentially focused on shifts in indexation adjustment among groups of fund par-
ticipants, without assuming any compensation in terms of higher expected indexation
for the groups that take on more risk. If it is possible to provide such compensation
(mostly to the young at the cost of the old generations), one might find more schedules
that make (almost) everyone better off than under uniform indexation. Such sched-
ules would necessarily be even more complicated than the schedules studied in this
paper and the welfare consequences for the various groups would need to be carefully
investigated, before implementing a switch away from uniform indexation. Moreover,
it would be a major challenge to clearly communicate how such alternatives operate.
Hence, for several reasons their practical applicability is not straightforward and we
leave the investigation of such schedules as an avenue for further research.
We found that an increase in the retirement age without touching the existing pen-
sion rights leaves our main findings unaffected. Realistically speaking, an increase
in the retirement age will be unavoidable with rising life expectancy. However, the
increase needs to be accompanied by an adjustment in the value of the existing pension
rights, such that current older workers and retirees finance a larger share of the longer
duration of their own pension benefits. Otherwise, as our simulations have shown,
pension contribution rates need to increase drastically from their current levels. The
resulting upward pressure on the total labour costs will reduce labour demand and
become unaffordable by firms that are under increasingly competitive pressure from
foreign firms operating in an environment with less generous pension arrangements.
The alternative to not raising contribution rates would be low indexation of pension
rights for a long time, which would gradually erode the real value of the pension
benefits.
Appendix: Estimation and Calibration of the Shocks
Growth Rate of Newborn Cohort
Each demographic shock is distributed independently of all other shocks. The growth
rate nt of the newborn cohort depends on deterministic and random components:
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nt = n + nt ,
with n the mean and nt the innovation at time t , which follows an AR(1) process with
parameter ϕ:





We estimate this model from data on the relative variation in the number of births in
the Netherlands (source is Human Mortality Database 2009.) We find n = 1.0021,
φ = −0.0624, σn = 0.0492.
Survival Probabilities
We simulate the cohort survival probabilities according to:
ln
(
1 − ψ j,t− j+1
) = ln (1 − ψ j,t− j
) + τ j
(









, j = 1, . . . , D,
with τ j an age-dependent coefficient, χ a constant growth factor (to describe the
historical trend increase in survival probabilities) and ψt− j+1 an innovation at time
t − j + 1 that follows an i.i.d. process with variance σ 2ψ . The parameters τ j and χ and
the shock process ψt− j+1 need to be estimated. This would require cohort life tables,
which are incomplete for recent cohorts. Using easily available period life tables,
however, leads to an over-estimation of mortality because of the well-documented
downward trend in mortality.
To correctly estimate mortality, we follow the Lee-Carter model (1992) and collect
from the Human Mortality Database (2009) Dutch period life tables from 1906 to
2005. These contain the total population on a year-by-year basis from ages 0–110.
In these tables, ψ pj,t is the population probability of surviving year t for individuals
aged j . These individuals thus have survived year t − 1. (Hence, probability ψ pj,t
should be distinguished from the cohort survival probability ψ j,t− j+1.) To distin-
guish the trend from fluctuations, we estimate with singular value decomposition the
parameters of the Lee-Carter model:
ln
(
1 − ψ pj,t
)
= α j + τ jχt + ηψt ,
where α j and τ j are age-varying parameters, χt is a time-varying vector and ηψt is a




. Lee and Carter (1992) point out that the
parameterization is not unique. Therefore, we choose the one fulfilling their suggested
restrictions:
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where t = 1, . . . , T indicates the sample period. With these restrictions it is easy to
see that the estimated value for α j will be the average probability over the sample that
someone dies at age j , when having survived up to age j − 1. Consistent with the
existing literature we assume that the mortality index χt evolves as a random walk
with drift χ :





. We estimate χˆ = −1.6733 and σˆψ = 0.0957, which implies a
trend fall in the probability of dying at any age j , conditional on having survived up
to age j − 1. In the simulations we assume that χˆ = 0 after year t = 40. That is, there
is no further population ageing after 40 years.
From the period life table estimates and the trend in the mortality index we calculate
the cohort life tables as follows:
ln
(
1 − ψ j,t− j+1
) = αˆ j + τˆ j
(
χˆt− j+1 + j χˆ
)
= αˆ j + τˆ j χˆt+1,
where t − j + 1 is the year of birth of the cohort.
In our simulations, the survival probabilities of the cohort born in year t = 0 are set
equal to those of the actual cohort of individuals born in 1950. Conditional survival
probabilities of cohorts of age j are linked over time as follows:
ln
(
1 − ψ j,t− j+2
) = αˆ j + τˆ j
(
χˆt− j+2 + j χˆ
)
= α j + τˆ j
(
χˆt− j+1 + j χˆ + χˆ
)




= ln (1 − ψ j,t− j+1
) + τˆ j χˆ .
Economic and Financial Shocks
We allow the shocks to the inflation rate, the nominal income growth rate, the one-year
bond return and the equity return to be correlated with each other and over time. These
variables follow the multivariate annual process (13) with the innovations following
the VAR(1) process (14).
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Table 4 VAR(1) regression
Variable Inflation Wage Bond Equity
a. Deterministic coefficient estimates (matrix B in (14))
Inflation (−1) 0.7685*** 0.5258*** 0.0584 −0.3263
(0.1789) (0.1848) (0.2668) (2.4723)
Wage (−1) −0.1757 0.0108 0.0222 −2.7298
(0.1828) (0.1888) (0.2726) (2.5258)
Bond (−1) 0.0670 0.0479 0.8700*** 0.8933
(0.0692) (0.0714) (0.1032) (0.9560)
Equity (−1) −0.0062 −0.0133 0.0152 −0.0123
(0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0190) (0.1764)
Wald chi-squared 58.5525 38.4297 98.2896 4.8642
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3015
b. Residual covariances and correlations (%)
Inflation 0.0107 33.3503 34.8257 −26.7663
Wage 0.0037 0.0114 −25.9594 −6.7091
Bond 0.0056 −0.0043 0.0238 −11.9154
Equity −0.0396 −0.0102 −0.0263 2.0449
Standard deviations in parentheses. ***: significant at 1%. Wald chi-squared: test on the joint significance
of the coefficients in each column, following a chi-squared distribution with four degrees of freedom.
Correlations in italics
The underlying data are the following time series, covering annually the period
1976–2005 (30 observations). For the economic variables (inflation rate and income
growth rate), we take series of the Dutch Consumer Price Index and Dutch hourly
wages (source for both series: OECD 2009). For the financial variables (bond and
equity returns), we consider U.S. time series, given the wide integration of the finan-
cial market and the larger availability of data for the U.S. We take series on end-of-year
public debt yields at maturity one year (source: Federal Reserve 2009) and the MSCI
U.S. equity index (source: Datastream 2009). For each series we take the deviations
from the historical average.
Table 4 shows the (annual-frequency) estimation of the deterministic component
(panel a) and the covariances and correlations of the residuals (panel b). It is worth
pointing out that only in the specification of the equity return the Wald chi-squared test
on the joint significance of the coefficients does not reject the hypothesis that returns
follow a purely random (white noise) process.
The Bond Yield Curve




k=1. The interest rate at maturity k = 1
will be set equal to the simulated short-term bond interest rate based on the VAR(1)
process (14), rb1,t = rsbt . To describe the components of the yield curve at maturities
k = 2, . . . , D, we focus on the rates in excess of the bond interest rate at maturity
1, r˜ bk,t . Following the prevailing literature (see, e.g., Evans and Marshall 1998; Dai
and Singleton 2000), we model the excess interest rates as a vector autoregressive
distributed lag (VADL) process with lag 1:
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˜N (0, ) . (19)
Each period t , the excess interest rate at maturity k, r˜ bk,t , k  2, is a linear combi-
nation of deterministic and random components. The deterministic part is a func-
tion of several variables at time t − 1: the excess interest rates at all maturities
k  2 and the four macro and financial variables whose shocks follow the VAR(1)
process (14). The random part is given by the innovations bk,t , which may be correlated
across maturities.
We estimate (19) using an annual time series of U.S. yield returns at maturities 2,
3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30 (the only observed maturities—source is Federal Reserve 2009)
over the period 1976–2006. In the sample there are occasionally missing values for
the yields at maturities 20 and 30 that we replace in the regression with their interpo-
lations. The output from the estimation of (19) is available upon request. We obtain
large R-squared statistics (above 0.95), slightly decreasing at longer maturities, and
always reject the hypothesis that the interest rates follow a white noise process. The
shocks estimated in (19) are highly correlated (usually above 80% and never below
71%); shocks tend to be more volatile at longer maturities (with a variance ranging
from 0.0003 at maturity 2 to 0.0027 at maturity 30), but they remain small compared to
the variance (0.0238) of shocks to the one-year bond returns estimated in (14). Having
estimated (19) for the maturities that are available, we then adopt a linear interpola-
tion over these yields to obtain the interest rates at any discrete maturity between 1
and 30. Interest rates at maturities longer than 30 are set equal to the interest rate at
maturity 30.
Actual yield returns at any maturity k ≥ 1 are then built as the sum of the VADL(1)



































































k=1 is given by the average yield at maturity 1, r
sb
, plus






























































This average bond yield curve increases monotonically up to k = 30, where it reaches
an estimated interest rate of 4.26%.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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